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The Computer is Not a Medium 
Ti mothy Binkley 
Abstract 
Computer art embraces a resplendent diversity of expres .. 
sive forms, including and exceeding those of traditionai 
media such as painting, sculpture, film and video. 
Although it is sometimes referred to as another artistic 
medium. the computer plays a fundamentally different role 
in the activities of making and viewing art. A computer can 
output to many media, but its mode of operation is not 
the same as theirs. While an interface connects a computer 
to a medium, it also keeps it from becoming one of them. 
By studying the concepts of interface, interaction, and 
simulation, profound differences become apparent. A 
medium supplies physical material receptive to creative 
formation, while a computer offers conceptual agency cap, 
able of contentious discourse: it fu nctions more like a 
creative parmer than an expressive channel. 
When visiting exhibitions of computer art it is not uncommon to 
encounter a baffling diversity of works including drawings, prints, 
paintings, photographs, sculptures, video, film, multi,media objects 
and performances as well as interactive installations. Faced with this 
plethora of creative expression, one cannot help but ask, "If the com, 
purer is a medium, which one is it?" 
In examining the rich variety of computer art already produced in 
its short histoTy1, we are hard pressed to point out any genuinely new 
medium distinct from those which already existed when the computer 
was first applied to creative endeavors: there are still the same old 
paint, ink, emulsion, light, sound, words, etc. The computer is rarely 
present in the gallery, and when it is, it is not usually exhibited as an 
object in its own right. In fact it communicates with us through tradi, 
tional media ( if it uses media at all) and more often than not its phys, 
ical presence is irrelevant. Its message is often recorded in a medium 
prior to the exhibition and carried in like any other art object. When 
it does calculate and communicate at the time of the show, it could be 
hidden in another room or even in another country, linked to a dis .. 
play in the gallery through telecommunications. Typically, the only 
time a computer is physically present is in real,time performances and 
interactive installations, where it does not usually function as a 
medium since its import lies not so much in the visual qualities of 
what it displays as in the development and discursive evolution 
through time of its interaction with us. 
I should like to argue here that the computer is not a medium. The 
fact that computer art can be realized in any medium suggests that it is 
not one of them. It does not stand alongside traditional media as a 2
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peer, but communicates through them remotely as an outside agitator 
bent on introducing foreign influences and conjuring up spirits from 
alien worlds. We can carry on a dialogue with a computer through 
media, and this interactivity, it seems to me, is prototypical of how 
the computer functions in an anisric environment. By examining 
some of its salient features we can learn how the use of a computer to 
make an differs from the use of media. What we find are not new 
media but rather media newly used - .. intelligent" media which 
behave differently while still embodying visual meaning through the 
same old physical substrate. The point is often not the aesthetic pres­
entation but the conceptual presence. A computerized oven still cooks 
a meal, but it does so with greater intelligence - it heats things up 
like its less savvy predecessors, but it lcnows enough not to burn the 
meal and to have it ready when you get home. 
In our discussion it will be helpful to have before us an explicit 
understanding of what a medium is. Joseph Margolis supplies a rele­
vant characterization: "a medium is a cultural instrumentality manif­
ested in a physical material. "2 There are at least three components to a 
medium so characterized which are relevant here. First, a medium is 
closely connected to a ph1sic.al material. Second, the artistic message is 
not incidentally connected to that physical material, but is embodied in 
it in a way similar to the way minds are embodied. One cannot readily 
transport an artistic message from a painting into an opera since the 
meaning of any medium artwork is intrinsically bound up with its 
physical manifestation. Third, a medium is more than simple physical 
material: it is a culturall1 defined communication channel whose 
expressive possibilities are determined, at least in part, by the cultural 
conventions which delimit that channel. On each of these three salient 
points, we will discover that computers and media diverge. By exa­
mining the concepts of interface, interaction, and simulation, which 
are emblematic traits of computer art, radical differences become 
apparent. We shall examine how the computer relates to media 
through interfaces, how it functions differently as an interactive agent, 
and how it exceeds the circumscribed scope of any medium by simu­
lating a wide variety of experiences and environments. 
1 .  The Enchanted Forest 
If Aspen.Spruce is a photograph, what is it a picture of (Figure 1 )? 
Despite its appearance, it does not depict an actual ·forest or even a 
real model of one. It might, in some sense, represent what's in the 
artist's imagination; and in this sense any work of art reveals - we 
usually say expresses - the images and ideas an artist has. But this 
artwork also represents something of an entirely different sort which 
is completely outside the scope of traditional painting or writing. 
There is an important sense in which it is a picture of the contents of 
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a computer's memory: there is a direct corrdation between the two. 
Aspen. Spruce is an example of one type of computer picture called a rascer 
image. According to the raster model of a computed picture. an image 
is a visual repTesentation of digital information contained in a frame 
buff er (also called image memory) which is that part of random access 
memory (RAM ) where a computer stores numbers it interprds as 
pictures. A raster image is typically a two-dimensional array of picture 
elements ( pixels), each of which is assigned a color based on a number 
in a particular location in the frame buffer which is correlated with 
the pixel. This 'representation' is not quite the same as the representa­
tion of a tree in a painting. For one thing, since numbers have no 
color, the correlation between the contents of RAM and colored dots 
in the picture is completely arbitrary and instantly changeable, 
although it is systematic. Yet each pixel in a raster picture is a transla­
tion into color of the value of a number which stands for that color 
and is situated in the memory location correlated with that particular 
pixel. 
By delving even deeper into remote electTonic recesses we discover 
that the trees themselves are unusual imaginary creations which can 
exist not only in the mind of an artist, but also in the mathematical 
structures which contain the information that defines what and where 
they are. Abstract systems of numbers determine the she and shape of 
each tree, its species, the exact placement of its branches and leaves, 
its location in the forest . . .  as well as what kind of day it is. A strictly 
numerical model of this enchanted forest can be submitted to the 
machinations of computational geometry to produce surprisingly real­
istic pictures of non-existent worlds. Borrowing a term from Jean 
Baudrillard, we might label this enigmatic digital realm nhyperreal" to 
capture the paradoxical reality of the fantasy worlds stored inside a 
computer.3 They bear the ontology of numbers: although not tangible 
objects, they are nevertheless manipulable entities and can be expe­
rienced as real things with resolute efficacy . A boy with joystick in 
hand is not flying a real airplane, but he is flying something (fantastic 
though it may be) whose movements are controlled by the palpable 
lever he grasps. Unlike her counterpart painter or novelist, the com­
puter artist works with a hyperreal creation which stands behind the 
scenes as a kind of cc meta-physical" object which prefigures the artis­
tic expression. 
The first problem we encounter with the notion that the computer 
is a medium is that the numbers which are the nsubstance" of compu­
ter art are not physical objects but conceptual ones. They need physi­
cal containers, but they can be stored equally well in many different 
formats and moved freely from one to another: graphite, electricity, 
magnetism, etc. Moreover, the physical basis of any particular hard­
ware is also incidental to computed creations. When making compu­
ter art it is irrelevant whether the technology of the machine is bas.ed 
on tubes, transistors, integrated circuits, light fibers, or beads on a 4
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string. 4 The creative role a computer plays is conceptually and not 
physically based, although the efficacy of its role is closely tied to 
technological developments in computing. Unlike the concrete and 
implacable presence of light and pigment brought into the gallery 
through the agency of visual media, the 1COmputer's Stance toward its 
creative sensory outlets is abstract and its influence on them remote. 
Numbers have a "meaning'' independent of their expression in any 
particular medium because they are concepts, not objects or events. 
They are fundamentally unlike sounds or colors, and their abstract­
ness is the basis of computations with them. 
What color is a number; how big is a bit? We know how cadmium 
yellow looKs and smells, what the pitch of middle C sounds like, and 
how a word should be spoken or written. It makes sense to inquire 
about the size and color of a blob of paint on a palette, but a bit has 
no characteristic look, sound, or smell because it is a concept, not an 
object. Duchamp may have stopped painting because he abhorred the 
:smell of oil, but the antipathy many artists have toward computers 
cannot be based on any sensory aversions. Presenting an image as a 
file of numbers which can be lodged in a frame buffer is fundamen­
tally different from presenting it as colored areas spread over a piece 
of canvas. A medium embodies its messages in an inseparable union 
of form and matter, but a computer encodes its information in an 
abstract sequence of bits with no intrinsic or favore·d physical 
manifestation. 
Due to its numerical basis, computer art has opened up for artistic 
exploration elaborate abstract worlds of shapes and forms heretofore 
inaccessible due to their complexity or simply to the fact that no one 
has been able to think them up without the assistance of computed 
mathematical tools. The popular Mandelbrot Set ( Figure 2 )  has become 
the paradigm of such imagery as legions of artists and mathematicians, 
as well as curious sightseers, have set upon their computers to catch 
glimpses of the intricate twists and turns of this mathematically 
defined object.s Computers can reveal conceptual structures to us that 
exist outside media. They make it possible to examine abstractilons 
visually by delivering them to us through media. Forays into these 
often intriguing domains have proven to be profitable not only for 
artists but also for scientists as well. They enable us to expand our 
vision for technical as well as creative purposes. 
The relationship of computed art to its outward manifestation is 
not the same as it is in media. Media embody information in their 
physical basis, but the information in a computer flits elusively from 
one place to another and is never permanently fused with any particu­
lar material, although it can readily be transported into many different 
ones. Pictures of hyperreal worlds are realized through what is called 
an inter/ace, which implements an automated correlation between 
numbers in RAM and colors on a slide, piece of paper, video moni-
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tor. etc. Another answer to the question what Aspen.Spruce is a pic­
ture of is "a Cathode Ray Tube (CRT)", since the image is a photo­
graph of a video monitor interfaced to the frame buffer holding the 
information which constitutes the image of trees. Computers can 
interface promiscuously ( though remotely ) to virtually any medium. 
and they are not among the media they interface to. (They can also 
talk to each other through digital channels which are different. but 
related to, interfaces ).  Furthermore, we need to use interfaced media 
to communicate with computers since we cannot ordinarily receive 
information directly in the forms it assumes inside a computer. 
Aspen.Spruce is exemplary in this respect - a photograph is used to 
present a computer-generated image which exists independent of the 
film. This does not mean, however, that computer artwork is always 
in a medium; conceptual art has clearly demonstrated that art need 
not use media.6 Even when they speak to us through media, compu­
ters talk the language of numbers and concepts. 
Media, on the other hand, cannot interface to anything. One might 
take a photog.raph of a painting, or paint a photograph, but one 
medium is simply providing the subject matter for another. The 
information stored in one medium is translated into another, and it 
never looks identical because different media possess different proper .. 
ties. So-called "computer-assisted" art is not a counterexample. 
When an artist uses, say, a computer-generated image displayed on a 
CRT as the basis for making a painting, the computer work is either a 
study for the painting, much the way a drawing might be, or else what 
we have is just another example of translation - this dme from video 
to paint. The frame buffer does not function as an original against 
which interfaced images can be compared. Computer art is not a 
mixed medium either: it is not a mixture of two or more media since, 
when co-present with media, the medium remains pure and simply 
gets its information from a new source. This is why the computer 
need not be present for each computer artwork: the computer did its 
work, the information was interfaced to and recorded on film or 
paint, and it can then be moved into the gaHery without carrying the 
computer along. Even when the computer is there, it does not mix 
with the medium as another material, but informs it through an 
interface. 
An interface conveys information, media embody it. While moving 
messages from conceptual to physical repositories, the interface from 
computer to medium usually converts information stored in digital 
form to information stored in analog form ( Figure 3 ). This distinction 
is characteristic of the difference between computer and media tools 
for artmaking. Lefs examine some of its features: 
a) Analog information cannot generally be separated from the 
medium in which it is created. When it is articulated, a physical 
impression is required: the painter's brush ·changes the canvas, and 
once imparted to the surface, the message is inseparable from it. 
6
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While one might try to produce a facsimile of a painting in a photo­
graph, it certainly is not possible to make the substitute in sound. Dig­
ital information, on the othcr hand, can readily be transferred from 
electricity Ito magnetism to light to print to sound to . . .  whatever. Dig­
ital information can freely be moved about with little risk of corrupt­
ing the message it contains, but transferring analog information from 
one medium to another is risky: photographs, for example, notor­
iously fail to replicate important features of paintings. 
b) Analog information is usually analogous to its source. The curve 
of the hand's movement over a canvas is analogous to the curve in the 
painted visual composition. But the digital informa tion created when 
the same motion is made across a digitizing table bears little analogy to 
the movement itsel£. The information is just lots of numbers resulting 
from the computer's sensation of minute fragments constituting a 
kind of analysis of the movement. 
c) When analog information is recorded or transmitted, a direct 
link is required:the painter's brush actually touches the canvas and we 
have to go to the gallery to see the result. Usually there is direct con­
tact between the information and its storage medium. But digital 
information stands removed from the hand and is related to it indi­
rectly by machinery. This difference constitutes part of the dis·tinction 
between embodying and interfacing information. 
d) Analog information is continuous and smooth,  while digital 
information is discrete and choppy. 
In general, I would say that media tend to use analog information, 
computers tend to use digital information, and that this is one of the 
dramatic differences between them. 
A bit is not something culturally formed the way painting, a paint 
stroke, or a style are: Its definition is formal and mathematical. The 
concepts of a bit or of the number two are cross-cultural in a sense in 
which the pentatonic scale and easel painting are not. Numbers are 
concepts that don't inherently capture and reflect genres and styles 
the way a physical medium does. A musical or visual medium is 
defined by certain cultural conventions which could be different and 
typically are not the same in different cultures. The embodiment of 
information in the medium follows these conventions. Information in 
a computer is not embodied so much as encoded, and while the sys­
tem of coding is conventional, it is also automated so that the rules of 
the conventions are not prescriptions for how to make art, but merely 
instructions for how to set up the interface. The instrumentality of a 
computer is mechanized, not conventionalized. An organized system 
of bits and numbers which constitute the substrate of computer art is 
simply stipulated and not culturally determined in the way a painting 
genre or operatic structure are. The notion of a 'bit' approaches the 
idea of information in a manner entirely different from that of media. 
A medium embodies information, which means that it is laden with 
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meaning through the enfranchisement of cultural practices which gov­
ern the creation and location of information in a formed object. But a 
bir is not inherently embodied in any medium: it is the basis of a 
science, and not simply an art, of information. The agreement that a 
painting will consist in what's on the fron't of the canvas and not 
what's on the back or the frame is different from the agreement that a 
bit is the atom of information or the stipulation that a certain arran­
gement of bits will store a raster image in a specified ·manner. 
2. The Magic Mountain 
An artist who is uncertain how rugged to make the mountains in a 
landscape can enlist the aid of a computer which, on simple com­
mands, will increase and decrease the number and sharpness of peaks, 
displaying a variety of alternatives from which the desired result can 
be chosen (Figure 4 ) . Similarly, by changing the parameters of a for­
mal language designed to generate plant ... like objects, one can get the 
computer to display a variety of species ( Figure 5 ). The artist makes a 
request or takes an action (by turning a knob, typing a message, mov­
ing a stylus, etc) and the computer responds with information and 
advice. A dialogue takes place between person and machine, and its 
outcome could just as easily be frustration or enlightenment as the 
production of art. 
Unlike a medium, a computer is not a communication channel 
characterized by culturally defined protocol that specifies how a mes­
sage should be formed. It is rather the kind of thing that appears at 
one end of such a channel: an entity with powers and agencies which 
can be manifested through media. Like a person, it uses media to 
communicate. embodying messages via interfaces which function as 
the machine's hands and eyes. 
Media and computers delineate two different pathways for artistic 
expression. A medium like painting cannot interact, but only react to 
what an artist does. It also takes a fixed and relatively passive stance 
toward the audience in a gallery. A computer, on the other hand, can 
function as an interactive partner in both the creative process and the 
artistic experience. The artist has no privileged position in making 
mountains move: that power can be put into the hands of the viewing 
public so that the artwork and not merely the making of it is an inter­
active adventure. 
When painting a canvas, an artist's imagination is expressed in the 
medium through a one-way channel in which the hand attempts to 
deposit ideas and images on the canvas. The artist may then use what 
is seen as a further stimulus to the imagination to refine and clarify 
the visual goa[: this is the whole point of making sketches (Figure 6 ) . 
But in this feedback cycle of progressive refinement, the medium 
remains passive. It cannot respond with anything beyond what the 8
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artist deposits in it. Once it is finished and installed in a gallery, the 
painting speaks to its audience in a similarly unresponsive one-·way 
communication. People who touch or talk to art on the wall are usu­
ally viewed with suspicion. 
A computer, on the other hand, can be actively responsive to the 
words and movements. of the artist, who might even choose to extend 
this somewhat anthropomorphic experience to the audience as part of 
the artworl.c. A computer is active: it computes . Its purpose is not 
primarily to store information, but to process it; indeed, it usually 
"forgets" the information you give it as soon as it is turned off. It is 
not an information channel, a passive medium, so much as an infor­
mation manipulator - dare we say a thinker! A computer can sense 
where the artist's finger points and react by choosing a color or regis­
tering a stroke or moving a mountain. The information flows in two 
directions. The computer receives input from the user, processes it, 
and responds in Hice kind (Figure 7).  What makes this possible is the 
interposed world of numbers specified by the artist and manipulated 
by the computer. It is through this shared conceptual realm that peo­
ple and machines communicate. 
This communication bears the marks of intelligent conversation, 
and the computer's interactive tools are sometimes said to have intel� 
ligence. What does this mean? I suppose one thing it means is that 
they are more partners than tools: they supply not only efficacy but 
agency. Differences from the tools of media emerge in some of the 
characteristic ways their abilities exceed the capabilities of physically 
manifested instrumentality. 
One hallmark of interactivity with an uintelligent" machine is the 
ability to discourse in generalities and dispense with the need to deli­
neate all the specifics: we can tell the computer to a.djust prope·rties of 
objects or images without delineating each and every detail as a pain­
ter must in manipulating pigment. Since the computer understands 
concepts, we can tell it to make the mountains rougher without saying 
exactly how it is to be done. This makes it possible for the artist to 
work at a h(gher level of generality. A media artist must conceive a 
creation with some determinateness and then execute it in all its 
meticulous detail in order to create a work: although the painter may 
conceive an image in generalities, every rock and blade of grass is 
painted in by hand with deliberate execution. A photographer can 
capture a whole scene at one snap, but the scene is seen before photo­
graphed, its details are knowable in advance. The medium artist must 
either create or find each detail. But the computer artist might simply 
say something like uPut a grove of aspen over here and a spruce forest 
over there with a meadow in between and bathe the whole setting in a 
warm afternoon sun." The computer wiill then determine all the 
necessary details: where each aspen leaf, spruce needle, and blade of 
grass is placed and how it reflects the light. The artist discovers these 
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details almost as a viewer and can typically be just as surprised at the 
result. The computer has the "intelligence" to figure out the details if 
you give it the general picture. With such a talented assistant� the 
computer artist can produce individuated things by describing them in 
general terms. To react with this apparent cognitive behavior, the 
computer system must be appropriately configured with hardware and 
software: a naked machine with empty chips is no more communica­
tive than a sleeping person. Thus, when I use the term 'computer' 
here, it refers to a complete system with the ability to interact. Origi­
nally a "computer" was a person who does calculations. When dis­
cussing the cultural role of computing machines, we need to consider 
not only the hardware (the "body"), but also the software that ani­
mates it (the 11 mind ,, ). I suppose one could say the hardware is the 
" medium" in which the computation happens (i.e. on which the 
software is run), as one could say the braitn is the "medium" in which 
thinking takes place. But I believe this sense of 'medium' is rather dif­
ferent from its paradigmatic artistic use. 
The challenge in media of conceiving and executing a work of art is 
supplemented in computer art by the enterprise of displaying and 
choosing alternatives. This gives rise to dilemmas of surfeit. Where 
the problem in media is to create the work, to get the message embo­
died, the problem in computer art is often to make a meaningful 
selection from an overabundance of alternatives playing out an end­
less· sequence of permutations. Dismayed at such a prodigious sea of 
possibility, the issue of making the right choice can often confuse an 
artist accustomed to the struggle for hard-won individuated expres­
sions in media. The very notion of a correct choice becomes suspect. 
An assistant is probably not best used by requesting myriad permuta­
tions in hopes a masterpiece will be chanced upon. Solving the prob­
lem of finding the jewel among reams of output is not a diminutive 
dletour around hard creative work. It is easy to lose sight of the forest 
for the trees. The modi operandi of a computer artist are different at 
least in some respects, from those of a painter; and for all their new 
potential, they bear equally novel dangers and distractions. 
The versatile interactive tools of the computer artist are also distin­
guished by the wide range of effects that can be wrought with similar 
creative techniques. Radically different looking results can be pro­
duced from the same mathematical tools adjusted to slightly different 
settings. Marble can be turned to clouds by changing a program 
sHghtly. Furthermore, similar inputs can result in quite different con­
sequences. A sweep of the hand over a tablet might produce a single 
red line, multiple multicolored lines, or perhaps just a change in the 
color of an imaginary pencil, depending upon how the computer 
interprets the motion. The machine can usually tell what the user 
intends by context, just as another person can know the correct horn, 
onym in conversation. 
10
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These characteristic features of computer art all stem from the 
nature of the insubstantial numerical material which provides the 
intangible milieu in which it operates. Herein lies a profound differ­
ence between creations in media and in machine memory. As a user 
addresses a computer, the features of imaginary mountains are 
adjusted, and not just properties of pictures of them. These moun­
tains are described by collections of numbers and formal techniques 
for manipulating numbers. When the m.ountains are smoothed , 
roughened, or changed in some other way, this description changes. 
So the computer artist is working in a fantasy world populated by 
creatures of his or her own imagination whose appearance is disco­
vered by interfaces which convey this world in RAM to media out­
side. The computer therefore supplies artists with more direct and 
tangible access to products of the imagination than ·that proffered by 
media, where changes in a fantasy can only be manifested through 
newly crafted images of it. The imagination is oddly objectified, and 
this is probably one of the most important new capabilities the com­
puter bestows upon creative artists. 
Baudrilla.rd's notion of "hyperreality" denotes this peculiar realm 
which supports the somewhat paradoxical combination of real activity 
on the part of the artist in an imaginary space which is only as real as 
its mathematical description, but in which the artist's actions have 
efficacy. This mechanized formal existence makes something possible 
with a computer which cannot be contemplated in any medium: one 
can malce a picture of something by first modelling it in an imaginary 
world and then asking the computer to produce a picture of it accord­
ing to various parameters placed in that created world. The interposi­
tion of hyperreality between the artist's imagination and the visual 
display makes interacti!on possible. What the artist interacts with 
resides in that world. Media cannot interact, in part, because of the 
inseparability of information and physical material. In an interactive 
video display it is the computer, not the video, that is doing the inte­
racting. Yet interactivity is the hallmark of even the simplest compu­
ter paint systems. Most artistic software tools in use today are 
interactive. 7 
The scope of interactivity extends even further to suggest new artis­
tic frontiers. Myron Kruger's work is a good example of art which 
encompasses a new dimension by interacting with the viewer. In his 
"Videoplace,�' a little "critter" has the ability to sense an individual 
person's shapes and movements and respond to them in a galle·ry 
installation where a computer is linked to a video system. I suspect 
this work is a harbinger of even more radical artforms to come. 
3. The Virtual Camera 
Although the computer is not a medium, it can pretend to be any one 
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of them. Precisely by virtue of what distinguishes it from media. a 
computer can be programmed to simulate them. Computer art has no 
characteristic look or behavior, but like a chameleon it can be made 
to take on the feel and appearance of a multitude of old and new 
tools. Notions of medium specificity are presented a serious challenge 
when confronted with an art-making environment which is not only 
capable of interfacing to any medium but also of casting a ruse for 
each one. 
I would like to put forth what may initially seem an outlandish 
claim. You cannot draw with a computer. I think of drawing as some­
thing that happens when a person uses an object to make a mark of 
some sort on a surface. One hopes this is not what happens when 
people make computer art: a gouge in the surface of a digitizing tablet 
is bad form. 
A computer is not a drawing instrument (and maybe not really a 
tool at all). If you can't see the monitor, an artist's empty motions 
over a small plastic surface must seem like some rather peculiar habits 
of an obsessive-compulsive. The hand moves in one place, the creative 
result is stored in another place, and the visual display comes out in 
yet a third place. This is not drawing. Instead, it is a computer simula­
tion of the activity of drawing. Most artists find it takes a while to get 
used to moving the hand on the tablet while looking somewhere else 
at the CRT. The creation occurs in a hyperreal world of digital infor­
mation. In this world, drawing feels a little like how it feels with pen 
and paper, but it can be quite different since the computer can inter­
actively manipulate numbers in many surprising ways. The inteUigent 
machine is a great pretender. It can make believe the artist holds a 
brush of any size or color when in fact nothing more than a dry 
slender cylinder is in the hand. But the scope of its simulation capabil­
ities extends far beyond the cultural conventions delimiting the artis­
tic exercise of media. It possesses a protean pliability which trans­
cends any particular physical basis. 
Kruger's work was featured in a recent Newsweek article entitled 
"Now, Artificial Reality" which examined the variety of simulators 
currently being used or developed for flight, medicine, war, art and a 
host of other human endeavors.9 Computer systems can be made to 
simulate a wide variety of environments, and this is becoming one of 
their most important uses today. Whether one agrees with Baudril­
lard's sometimes sinister view of simulation, he certainly is correct in 
emphasizing its significance for contemporary and future cultures. 
In their well-known text on computer graphics, Foley and Van Dam 
call the computer a "synthetic camera" constituted by numbers in a 
world whose other denizens share a similar ethereal existence. •0 
Exploring this analogy will help us understand something about the 
possibility and nature of using the computer for graphic simulations. 
It is illuminating to look at the two algorithms by which perspective 12
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pictures are made using media on the one hand and computers on the 
other. A real camera embodies formulae for producing images which 
di ffer radkally from those employed by the virtual camera concocted 
inside a computer to simulate the behavior of its real counterpart. 
An algorithm is a set of Step--by-step instructions for accomplishing 
a taslc. Information that can serve as instructions - that can be used 
to do things - functions quite unlike information in media that just 
sits there in storage, and also differs from the data stored in RAM as 
an image. Algorithmic information supplies a how-t�do vs a how-ir­
is, and it iis an essenti,al ingredient in making machines appear to 
thinlc. The importance of information in a computer lies primarily in 
its active form as instructions (knowing how to do things), and not 
simply in its passive form as data (knowing that such and such is the 
case). Information storage in media can effectively depict the real 
world; but the exercise of algorithms in a computer can function to 
simulate an imaginary one. 
The geometric algorithm practiced so effectively by Renaissance 
artists (and mechanized in cameras) is a loosely defined set of passive 
instructions which the painter can follow to render a scene in perspec­
tive ( Figure 8 ). The algebraic algorithm utilized by computer render­
ings, however, actively produces an image automatically without the 
need for an artist to figure anything out except what is to be pictured 
and from where (Figure 9). The former functions in the concrete 
space of the real world using a physically defined point and plane for 
the eye and the picture plane; the latter performs its task in the hyper­
real world of a coordinate system where points and planes are nothing 
but numbers and equations. Leonardo constructed his perspective 
renderings using the time honored techniques of Euclidean geometry, 
while a computer artist asks the machine to compute its results using 
analytic geometry of a more recent origin. The results of the construc­
tion are delivered directly onto the picture surface, but the results of 
calculation must be appropriately interfaced to a medium to make the 
perspective picture visible. Even though the camera obscura aut� 
mated the geometric algorithm and eventually evolved into the mod­
ern camera, it still functions today by the same concrete rules. E 1 
The computer is not a medium because it does not embody ·mean­
ings in a physical substance according to cultural conventions. But if it 
is not a medium, what is it? What we've got here is a new poly mor­
phous beast whose effects on human culture are not yet well under­
stood, although they clearly will be profound. So I don't have any 
easy answers to this question. And furthermore, I think others. may 
have been led to believe it is a medium because they don't have any 
good answers to this question either. The best I can do now is to 
proffer the somewhat lame metaphor: creative partner. But this does 
at least capture the radically different role computers are playing in 
artmaking when compared to the one traditionally occupied by 
media.12 
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Notes 
See Cynthia Goodman. D1g1wl Visions (Ne" York:Abrams. 1968). This book. 
based on her exhibition "Computers and An." surveys the broad and diverse 
range of amstic endeavors unden.aken ";th the aid o( computers. 
Joseph Margolis, "Film as a Fine Art," Millennium 1 4/ 1 5  (Fall/Winter. 1984-
85 ). p. 95. One could argue that this definition is not suitable for describing 
literature since words are not made of physical materials. Margolis defends his 
definition, but the discussion at hand need not tum on whether one is convinced 
by his defense. It is sufficient simply to agree that words, whatever else they may 
be. are not concepts. ln the arguments that follow. painting is the paradigm of a 
medium that l have in mind; however l believe the· fundamental points being 
made apply to any artistic medium. 
J Jean Baudrillard. Simularions (New York:Semiotexc( e ). 1983 ). 
4 Jay Barchrach accuses me of functionalism because of statements like this one. 
I'm not sure how to plead, but it might help to clarify what I'm �etting at here. It 
is possible to follow "by hand" (and "by mind," to be sure) the processes which 
lead up to a computer.-ge�rated picture. One could write down the numbers 
and do the calculations with pencil on paper, and then use a box of crayons to 
put colored dots on graph paper ro create a "hand-made" raster image (much 
like "paint by number"). The fact that a silicon-based computer can do the same 
thing a million times faster is not merely a quantitative difference, but gives rise 
to qualitative differences as well. So the constitution o( hardware is important in 
many ways, but it docs not affect the basic relationship ooween numbers and 
colors in a rasrer image. 
s Benoit Mandelbrot is responsible for the relatively simple but extraordinarily 
fecund definirion of chis set of numbers in the complex plane. He has also deve· 
loped a new kind of "fractal" mathematics which has proven to be useful not 
only in making computer images, but also in articulating scientific theories. Sec 
The Fractal Geometry of Nat14re (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1983). For more 
examples of rich imagery based on mathematics, see H. 0. Peitgen and P. H. 
Richter, Eds . . The Beauty of Fractals, (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1986 ). See also 
Heinz-Otto Peitgen and Deitmar Saupe, Eds., The Science of Fractal Images 
(New York: Springer-Verlag, 1988). 
0 Sec ''Piece: Contra Aesthetics," Journal of Aesthetics and Art Crit icism XXXV 
( 1977). Reprinted in Joseph Margolis, Ed., Philosophy Looks at the Arts (Phila­
delphia: Temple University Press, 1987 ). 
1 As David Fisher has pointed out, literature may pose a general problem for this 
discussion since it works in a medium that is digital and creates things that are 
more like concepts than objects. However, it seems apparent that regardless of 
how one analyzes the "substance" of the medium of literature, there are rwo 
fundamental ways in which it differs from computer creations. One is that by 
describing the objects and events in a novel, there is no sense in which one is 
actually creating a model of them that can be inhabited and manipulated through 
simulations. The other is that literature cannot interact. 
8 Noel Carroll has criticized beliefs in medium specificity from a somewhat differ­
ent perspective. See his "Medium Specificity Arguments and Self-Consciously 
Invented Arts: Film, Video and Photography," Millennium 14/1 5  (Fall/Winter, 
1984-85). 
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' Fcbrwry 9, 1987, pp. 56-57. Gene Youngblood characteri� this type of envu­
onmcnt u one where context supersedes content as the crcaovc focu . I think 
thLS ts a u�ful way to understand one aspect of how interactive art d1ff ers from 
its puiivc predeccwou. 
ic James Folty and Andnes Van Dam, Fund.ameruau of lnlfTaalw.> Computer 
Grap#uo (Read mg, MA: Add150n· Wesley. 1982 ). 
11 The two algorithms are dlscussed more fully m my a rode, "Computed Space," 
ProcealcngJ of rht National C.0mP1"C GraphtCJ AJJOClaClon ( 1987 ), Vol. Ill. 
ii Earlier versions of this paper were read ac meetmgs of the National Computer 
Graphta Assoc�tion, the Paofic Division of the American Society for Aesthet­
ics, and the New York City ACM/SIGGRAPH. l am grateful to Linda Ashley. 
Ken Glickfeld, Jay Bachrach, David Fisher, and a number of other respondents 
for u.st"ful comments which helped mitigate the folly. 
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Figure 1 .  Aspen . pmce By 8111 Ree\'e , from Al"y Ra • mith, 
"Plants, Fractals, and Formal Language ," Computer Graphic V. 
18. No. 3 (July 19 4 ) , pp. 1 - 10. 
Figure 2. Manddbrot Sec. In this image from an animated sequence, the 
two-dimensional set is mapped onto a sphere by John Simon, Jr .  
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Figure 3. Interface 01g1tal information can be experienced by usrng a 
d1g1tal-ro-analog converter ro express 1t in a med iu m . 
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Figure 4. The Magic Mounrwn. Three ver ion of the ame terrain wirh 
different rugg'l!dne by R ichard Vo . Publi hed in BenulC �1andd­
brot. The Fractal Geometry of ature ( ew York: W. H. Free­
man, 1 9  3 ). 
Figure 5. Bushes. Alvy Ray mith, "Plants, Fractal , and Formal Lan­
guages," Computer Graphics V. 1 8, No. 3 (July 1 984), pp. I - 1 0. 
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Figure 6. The Expresrn .. e Pachu:ay Using Media. 
Figure 7 .  The Expressive Pathway Using Computers. 
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Figure 8.  The Geometric AlJ?orichm. Albrechr Durer, DesiKTier of che 
Luce, 1 5 3 5 .  
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Figure 9. The Algebraic Algorithm. Toma, 1985. 
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